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One of the Federal Reserve's roles is to provide 
payment services to depository institutions and to 
the U.S. Treasury. Many of the nation's transfers of 
funds—whether they are large-dollar payments for 
financial market transactions or smaller-value busi-
ness and consumer payments—settle through deposi-
tory institutions' accounts held at the Federal Reserve 
for reserve-maintenance purposes and transaction 
processing. 
In settling these payments, the Federal Reserve 
Banks post debits and credits to depository institu-
tions' Federal Reserve accounts throughout the busi-
ness day. If a depository institution has insufficient 
balances during the day to cover its debits, the insti-
tution will run a negative balance or "daylight over-
draft'' in its Federal Reserve account until sufficient 
funds are received later in the day. Depository institu-
tions often incur daylight overdrafts in their Federal 
Reserve accounts because of the mismatch in timing 
between the settlement of payments owed and the 
settlement of payments due. Because depository insti-
tutions generally hold a relatively small amount of 
funds overnight in their Federal Reserve accounts in 
relation to the trillions of dollars of payments pro-
cessed by the Federal Reserve each day, the Federal 
Reserve extends intraday credit to ensure the smooth 
functioning of the U.S. payment system. 
Each depository institution is expected to end 
each business day with a zero or positive balance in 
its Federal Reserve account. Otherwise, the Federal 
Reserve could incur significant losses if institutions 
failed with large overdrafts in their accounts. In addi-
tion, the significant payment activity that occurs 
on private large-dollar payment systems gives rise 
to credit, liquidity, operational, and legal risks; these 
risks must be managed by the system. Settlement 
failures on such private large-dollar systems that lack 
certain risk controls could create serious disruptions 
in the financial markets. 
To reduce the risks that depository institutions 
present to the Federal Reserve through their use of 
daylight credit and to address the risks that payment 
systems, in general, present to the banking system 
and other sectors of the economy, the Federal Reserve 
Board in 1985 developed a payments system risk 
(PSR) policy. One of the primary goals of the PSR 
policy is to control depository institutions' use of 
Federal Reserve intraday credit, and as the PSR pol-
icy has evolved, the Board has adopted specific meth-
ods for controlling daylight overdrafts. 
One of the first methods for controlling daylight 
overdrafts was setting a maximum for the daylight 
overdraft position (net debit cap) that a depository 
institution could incur in its Federal Reserve account. 
However, despite the introduction in 1985 of net 
debit caps, the amount of daylight credit the Federal 
Reserve was extending to depository institutions con-
tinued to grow. 
From 1986 to 1993, the value of daylight over-
drafts grew at an average annual rate of about 13 per-
cent. In fact, beginning in 1989, daylight overdrafts 
increased dramatically despite a reduction in net 
debit caps the year before. Consequently, the Board 
decided to create an economic incentive for deposi-
tory institutions to reduce their reliance on Federal 
Reserve daylight credit by charging them a fee for its 
use. 
In 1994, shortly after the Federal Reserve began 
charging daylight overdraft fees, peak daylight over-
drafts fell almost 40 percent, from approximately 
$125 billion to less than $80 billion. The fee was 
initially set at an annual rate of 24 basis points in 
1994, with planned increases in 1995 and 1996. 
[note: 1]. 57 Fed. Reg. 47084 (October 14, 1992). [end of note.] 
In 
1995, however, the Board decided to raise the rate 
charged on daylight overdrafts to 36 basis points 
instead of the 48 basis points that had been planned 
and to defer additional rate increases because day-
light overdrafts had fallen substantially. The Board 
stated that it would evaluate additional rate increases 
based on experience at the new fee level. 
As part of its obligation to further evaluate fee 
increases and in recognition that significant changes 
had occurred in the banking, payments, and regu-
latory environment since 1995, the Board decided to conduct a broad review of its daylight credit policies 
beginning in early 2000. The review included an 
analysis of trends in payment activity and proposals 
for changes in the Board's PSR policy. The history of 
the Board's PSR policy, trends in daylight overdraft 
and payment activity, and a possible future policy 
direction are discussed in this article. 
HISTORY OF THE BOARD'S 
INTRADAY CREDIT POLICIES. 
Initial Studies of Payment System Risk. 
In the late 1970s, the Federal Reserve began to assess 
the risks associated with daylight credit extensions 
in large-dollar payment systems, including Fedwire. 
During the 1980s, Federal Reserve staff and private-
sector groups issued several reports identifying the 
causes, amounts, and risks of daylight overdrafts, as 
well as options for controlling them. According to 
one of the reports, aggregate daily daylight overdrafts 
in depository institutions' Federal Reserve accounts 
averaged approximately $30 billion, and the majority 
of these overdrafts were attributable to fewer than 
twenty institutions. 
[note: 2]. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Risks on 
Large-Dollar Transfer Systems (Washington, D.C.: Board of Gover-
nors, February 1984). [end of note.] 
In addition, institutions incurring 
large overdrafts on Fedwire frequently had large 
credit exposures on the Clearing House Interbank 
Payments System (CHIPS), a private, large-dollar 
payment system operated by the New York Clear-
ing House. (For a brief description of Fedwire 
and CHIPS, see the box ''Large-Value Payment 
Systems.'') 
These early studies of payment system risk 
acknowledged that the risk of large losses resulting 
from an unexpected bank failure was small but noted 
that such a failure had the potential for a significant 
negative effect on financial markets and the payments 
mechanism. Thus, even a low probability of an 
extremely costly failure suggested the need for pru-
dent policies to address payment system risk. Con-
sequently, the Federal Reserve began to develop its 
PSR policies to address both systemic risk and the 
Federal Reserve Banks' credit risk. 
Although federal regulations guarantee the final-
ity of payments over Fedwire, thus eliminating 
settlement-failure risk for such payments, settlement 
failures on private large-dollar systems that lack both 
immediate finality and strong risk controls could 
create serious disruptions and could even lead to 
systemic risk in the financial markets. 
[note: 3]. Fedwire funds transfers are final and irrevocable when a Federal 
Reserve Bank credits the receiving institution's account or sends the 
receiving institution an advice of payment, whichever occurs first 
(12 C.F.R. 210, Appendix A to Subpart B). [end of note.] 
If an institu-
tion participating on a private large-dollar payments 
network were unable or unwilling to settle its net 
debit position, the institution's creditors on that net-
work might face lower credit positions than expected 
and then be unable to settle their commitments in 
that network or other networks. Serious repercussions 
could spread to other participants in the network, to 
other depository institutions, and to the nonfinancial 
economy generally. 
During the initial studies of payment system risk, 
Federal Reserve staff members and others noted that 
settlement failures in CHIPS could result in systemic 
risk because, by the early 1980s, CHIPS had not fully 
implemented certain risk controls to help guarantee 
settlement. 
[note: 4]. Association of Reserve City Bankers, Report on the Payments 
System (Washington, D.C.: ARCB, April 1982) and Risks in the 
Electronic Payments Systems (Washington, D.C.: ARCB, October 
1983); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Reducing 
Risk on Large-Dollar Transfer Systems (Washington, D.C.: Board of 
Governors, April 1985); Task Force on Controlling Payments System 
Risk (Report to the Payments System Policy Committee of the Federal 
Reserve System), Controlling Risks in the Payments System (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Board of Governors, August 1988). [end of note.] 
In addition, CHIPS participants extended 
very large amounts of intraday credit to each other 
and often permitted customers in a net credit position 
to use their expected funds before settlement. Under 
these circumstances, the default of a large CHIPS 
participant could have caused the unwinding of that 
day's net settlement, potentially leaving other partici-
pants with very large, sudden shortfalls in funding 
late in the day. The Federal Reserve was concerned 
that the failure of a participant on a private large-
dollar system could affect the liquidity and sol-
vency of multiple banks and lead to instability in the 
banking system and possibly the economy in general. 
In February 1984, the Board issued a report high-
lighting a number of conditions that supported the 
need for payment system risk controls. 
[note: 5]. See Risks on Large-Dollar Transfer Systems. In 1984, the Board 
also issued the Policy Statement on Use of the Federal Reserve's Wire 
Transfer Network, which explained that institutions should not use 
Fedwire to avoid risk-reduction measures on private-sector systems 
(49 Fed. Reg. 13194 [April 3, 1984]). [end of note.] 
The condi-
tions included the potential costs to the private and 
public sector from the failure of a depository institu-
tion in an overdraft position, the lack of existing 
private-sector incentives to reduce credit exposures, 
and the potential moral hazard arising from a deposi-
tory institution's expectation that the Federal Reserve 
would intervene to prevent settlement failures. [beginning of box:] Large-Value Payment Systems. 
Fedwire Funds Transfer System. 
The Fedwire funds transfer system is a real-time gross set-
tlement system. Transactions are continuously settled on 
an individual, order-by-order basis without netting. When a 
depository institution initiates a Fedwire funds transfer, it 
irrevocably authorizes the Federal Reserve to debit its Fed-
eral Reserve account for the amount of the transfer. The 
Federal Reserve then credits the account of the receiving 
depository institution. This immediate finality of payment is 
the major distinguishing characteristic of the Fedwire funds 
transfer service. 
Fedwire Book-Entry Securities System. 
The Fedwire book-entry securities system is a real-time, 
delivery-versus-payment (DVP), gross settlement system 
that allows for the immediate, simultaneous transfer of 
government securities against payment. A DVP system 
ensures that the final transfer of one asset occurs if and only 
if the final transfer of another asset (or other assets) occurs. 
The Fedwire securities system consists of a safekeeping 
function and a transfer and settlement function. The safe-
keeping function involves the electronic storage of securi-
ties records in custody accounts; the transfer and settlement 
function involves the electronic transfer of securities 
between parties, either free of payment or against payment. 
CHIPS. 
The Clearing House Interbank Payments System is a bank-
owned payment system operated by the New York Clearing 
House that has existed for more than thirty years to clear 
and settle business-to-business transactions. Since CHIPS 
was launched in 1970, it has undergone several modifica-
tions to reduce the risks it presented to the payment system. 
For example, in 1981, CHIPS moved from next-day to 
same-day settlement. In 1984, CHIPS added rules on bilat-
eral limits, and two years later, CHIPS imposed sender net 
debit caps, thereby limiting the risk that a single participant 
could present to the system. In 1990, settlement-day finality 
was guaranteed in case of an insolvency of the system's 
largest debtor through the imposition of a loss-sharing 
formula and collateral requirements. Most recently, on Janu-
ary 22, 2001, the Clearing House Interbank Payments Com-
pany L.L.C. converted CHIPS from an end-of-day, multi-
lateral net settlement system to one that provides final 
settlement for all payment orders as they are released. 
Payment instructions submitted to the queue that remain 
unsettled at the end of the day, known as the residual, are 
tallied on a multilateral net basis. 
[note: 1]. Payments Risk Committee (Intraday Liquidity Management Task 
Force), ''Intraday Liquidity Management in the Evolving Payment System: 
A Study of the Impact of the Euro, CLS Bank, and CHIPS Finality" (New 
York, N.Y.: PRC, April 2000); available on line at http://www.ny.frb.org/prc/ 
intraday.htm. [end of note.] [end of box.] 
1985 Policy Statement. 
In May 1985 the Board issued the Policy Statement 
Regarding Risks on Large-Dollar Wire Transfer Sys-
tems, which incorporated the findings of the earlier 
reports. 
[note: 6]. 50 Fed. Reg. 21120 (May 22, 1985). [end of note.] 
The policy statement introduced four cate-
gories of cross-system sender limits, or net debit 
caps, on daylight overdrafts and credit exposures 
over all large-dollar networks, including Fedwire and 
CHIPS. A depository institution could choose one 
of the four cross-system net debit cap categories 
or classes by evaluating its creditworthiness, credit 
policies, and operational controls and procedures, 
an evaluation referred to as a self-assessment. If 
the depository institution believed that its policies, 
controls, and procedures were strong, it could adopt 
a "high" cap class; weaknesses required the adop-
tion of a lower cap class. Although the choice of a 
net debit cap class was voluntary, an institution's 
bank examiners could review the institution's self-
assessment and require a modification to its cap class 
if the institution's level of daylight overdrafts and 
credit exposures constituted an unsafe or unsound 
banking practice. 
Along with each cap class, the Board implemented 
two cap multiples: one for the maximum allowable 
overdraft or exposure on any day (single-day cap) 
and one for the maximum allowable average of the 
peak daily overdrafts or exposures in a two-week 
period (two-week average cap) (table 1). 
Table 1. Multiples for net debit caps, 1985 




High  3.0  2.0 
Above average  2.5  1.5 
Average  1.5  1.0 
Zero  0  0 
NOTE. Net debit cap = cap multiple * capital measure (see text note 7). 
Note on Single-day cap multiple: Maximum allowable overdraft on any day. 
Note on Two-week average cap multiple 
Maximum allowable average of the peak daily overdrafts in a two-week 
reserve-maintenance period. 
An institu-
tion's cap category, the associated cap multiple, and 
its reported capital determined, and continue to deter-mine, the size of the net debit cap. An institution's 
net debit cap is calculated as follows: 
Net debit cap = cap multiple * capital measure. 
[note: 7]. The capital measure used in calculating a depository institution's 
net debit cap depends upon its chartering authority and home-country 
supervisor. [end of note.] 
For example, an institution with a high net debit cap 
could incur a single-day daylight overdraft of up to 
three times its capital without breaching its single-
day net debit cap. 
The Federal Reserve implemented the higher 
single-day net debit cap to limit excessive daylight 
overdrafts on any day and to ensure that institutions 
developed internal controls that focused on daily 
exposures. The purpose of the two-week average net 
debit cap was to reduce the overall levels of over-
drafts while allowing for fluctuations in the value of 
daily payments. Overall, the Board expected that, 
because of the policy, there would be a reduction in 
aggregate daylight overdrafts and in the number of 
depository institutions consistently relying on day-
light credit. 
In establishing net debit caps, however, the Board 
acknowledged that some intraday credit would be 
necessary for the smooth operation of the payment 
system, especially the U.S. government securities 
market. U.S. government securities settle through 
depository institutions' Federal Reserve accounts 
and, until the Federal Reserve began charging a 
fee on daylight overdrafts, contributed to signifi-
cant overdrafts at some banks. Specifically, when a 
depository institution receives a government secur-
ity over Fedwire, the institution's Federal Reserve 
account is automatically charged for the purchase 
price of the security. 
[note: 8]. Transfers of government securities occur electronically among 
depository institutions over the Fedwire book-entry securities system. [end of note.] 
The Board recognized that 
receivers of government securities generally cannot 
control the timing of daylight overdrafts associated 
with these transfers (referred to as securities-related 
overdrafts). As a result, the Board had concerns 
that daylight overdraft restrictions might impair the 
smooth functioning of the U.S. government securities 
market and, consequently, the Federal Reserve's 
ability to conduct monetary policy through open mar-
ket operations. Therefore, the Board exempted such 
securities-related overdrafts from net debit caps and 
other quantitative controls to avoid any potential 
market disruptions. 
Policy Changes: 1987-90. 
In 1987, the Board issued an interim policy state-
ment, pending re-evaluation of the Board's payment 
system risk-reduction program, that expanded on 
the 1985 statement. 
[note: 9]. 52 Fed. Reg. 29255 (August 6, 1987). [end of note.] 
The 1987 policy statement 
contained several provisions. Net debit caps were to 
be reduced by 25 percent in two phases: 15 percent in 
January 1988 and 10 percent in May 1988. Deposi-
tory institutions were exempted from performing a 
self-assessment if their board of directors approved 
a de minimis net debit cap, which was set at the 
lesser of $500,000 or 20 percent of adjusted pri-
mary capital. 
[note: 10]. The de minimis cap is intended for depository institutions that 
incur relatively small overdrafts and thus pose minimal risk to the 
Federal Reserve. [end of note.] 
A $50 million limit was imposed on 
individual government securities transfers. Finally, 
interaffiliate Fedwire funds transfers were permitted 
provided certain safeguards were observed. 
Within a year after the Board reduced net debit 
caps, daylight overdrafts as a percentage of dollars 
transferred over Fedwire fell approximately 5.5 per-
cent. Despite this decline, the Board noted that vir-
tually all depository institutions remained generally 
unconstrained relative to their reduced net debit 
caps; therefore, it sought to reduce the aggregate 
level of payment system risk further and to shift a 
higher proportion of risk to the private sector. Conse-
quently, the Board requested comment on proposed 
changes to its payment system risk-reduction pro-
gram in mid-1989. 
[note: 11]. 54 Fed. Reg. 26094 (June 21, 1989). 
Some of these changes included 
(1) charging a fee for depository institutions' use 
of Federal Reserve daylight credit, (2) modifying the 
criteria for measuring daylight overdrafts, (3) includ-
ing overdrafts caused by government securities trans-
fers when measuring an institution's daylight over-
drafts against its cap, and (4) adding an exempt-from-
filing cap category. 
[note: 12]. The proposed filing exemption would apply to institutions that 
create only low-dollar risks for the Reserve Banks and that incur small 
overdrafts relative to their capital. [end of note.] 
The Board's proposal presumed 
that CHIPS would revise its rules in the near future to 
provide greater assurance of settlement-day finality 
and that other private-sector delivery-versus-payment 
systems for securities, netting arrangements, and off-
shore dollar clearing systems would also adopt sys-
temic risk-reducing policies. 
[note: 13]. A delivery-versus-payment system is a mechanism that ensures 
that the final transfer of one asset occurs if and only if the final 
transfer of another asset occurs. Assets could include monetary assets, 
securities, or other financial instruments. [end of note.] After considering the comments received on its 
mid-1989 proposal, the Board issued a revised policy 
statement in May 1990. The revised policy statement 
did not include daylight overdraft fees or a modified 
method for measuring daylight overdrafts. Because 
nearly 75 percent of commenters opposed certain 
aspects of the pricing and measurement proposals, 
the Board decided to reevaluate these proposals 
before incorporating them into the policy. 
The 1990 statement incorporated the Board's other 
proposed changes. First, depository institutions' 
credit exposures on CHIPS were excluded from the 
cross-system net debit cap because CHIPS had imple-
mented loss-sharing and collateral agreements to 
improve settlement-day finality. Second, adjusted 
primary capital was replaced with ''qualifying'' (risk-
based) capital for purposes of calculating net debit 
caps. Third, an exempt-from-filing cap equal to the 
lesser of $10 million or 20 percent of an institution's 
capital was incorporated. Fourth, the existing de mini-
mis cap multiple was changed to 20 percent of an 
institution's capital (table 2). Finally, uncollateralized 
daylight overdrafts caused by government securities 
transfers were to be included when measuring deposi-
tory institutions' daylight overdrafts against their net 
debit caps. 
[note: 14]. 55 Fed. Reg. 22087 and 22092 (May 31, 1990). When the 
Board introduced daylight overdraft fees in 1994, it raised the de 
minimis cap to 40 percent of capital. See 59 Fed. Reg. 54915 (Novem-
ber 2, 1994). [end of note.] 








Two week average: 
1990 
High  3.0  2.25  2.0  1.50 
Above average  2.5  1.875  1.5  1.125 
Average  1.5  1.125  1.0  .75 
De minimis  na 
.20  na 
.20 








Zero  0  0  0  0 
NOTE. See notes to table 1. 
Note on exempt: The exempt-from-filing cap is equal to the lesser of $10 million or 
20 percent of the institution's capital measure. 
The Board ultimately decided to include uncollat-
eralized securities-related daylight overdrafts when 
determining an institution's compliance with its cap, 
even though depository institutions could not control 
the timing of the receipt of government securities 
transfers. The Board was concerned that intraday 
securities-related overdrafts, like intraday overdrafts 
resulting from all other payment activity affecting an 
institution's Federal Reserve account balance (funds-
related overdrafts), have the potential to become 
overnight overdrafts. 
To protect the Federal Reserve Banks from the 
very large exposures that resulted from settling gov-
ernment securities transactions, the Board's 1990 pol-
icy required collateral from depository institutions 
with positive net debit caps that frequently exceeded 
their caps by material amounts solely because of 
government securities transactions. 
[note: 15]. To determine whether an institution exceeded its net debit cap 
solely because of government securities activity, the Reserve Bank 
determined what activity in an institution's Federal Reserve account 
was attributable to funds transfers and other payment transactions and 
what activity was attributable to government securities transfers. For 
the purposes of the policy, ''frequently'' exceeding the cap meant 
more than three occasions in two consecutive two-week reserve-
maintenance periods, and ''material amounts'' meant amounts in 
excess of 10 percent of the institution's cap. [end of note.] 
Furthermore, 
the Board exempted collateralized securities-related 
overdrafts from net debit cap limits because it did not 
want to unduly disrupt the government securities 
market. The Board recognized that (1) collateralized 
daylight overdrafts presented less risk to the Federal 
Reserve Banks, (2) depository institutions could not 
control the timing of the receipt of government secu-
rities, and (3) the government securities market was 
important for the Federal Reserve's implementation 
of monetary policy. 
Introduction of Daylight Overdraft Fees: 
1991-95. 
In January 1991, the Board again requested comment 
on assessing fees for daylight overdrafts incurred 
by depository institutions in their Federal Reserve 
accounts and on a proposed method for posting debits 
and credits to these accounts to measure daylight 
overdrafts for pricing. 
[note: 16]. 56 Fed. Reg. 3098 (January 28, 1991). [end of note.] 
To facilitate the pricing of 
daylight overdrafts, the Board's proposed method 
of measuring them more closely reflected the timing 
of actual transactions affecting an institution's intra-
day Federal Reserve account balance. 
[note: 17]. At the time, Fedwire funds and government securities transfers 
were posted to institutions' Federal Reserve accounts as they were 
processed during the business day (as they still are today). The net of 
all automated clearinghouse (ACH) transactions was posted as if the 
transactions occurred at the opening of business, regardless of whether 
the net was a debit or credit balance. All other or ''non-wire'' activity 
was netted at the end of the business day, and if the net balance was a 
credit, the credit amount was added to the opening balance. If the net 
balance was a debit, the debit amount was deducted from the closing 
balance. Under this method, an institution could use all of its non-wire 
net credits to offset any Fedwire funds or government securities debits 
during the day but postpone the need to cover non-wire net debits until 
the close of the day. [end of note.] 
This mea-surement method incorporated specific account post-
ing times for different types of transactions and was 
intended, in large part, to support the assessment 
of daylight overdraft fees. The Board expected that 
pricing daylight credit would create an incentive for 
institutions to reduce overdrafts at Federal Reserve 
Banks, thereby reducing direct Federal Reserve risk 
and contributing to economic efficiency. 
In October 1992, the Board announced that the 
Federal Reserve Banks would begin using new crite-
ria for measuring institutions' daylight overdraft lev-
els and charging a fee for the use of daylight credit. 
The fee was to be phased in and was scheduled as 
an annual rate of 24 basis points in 1994, 48 basis 
points in 1995, and 60 basis points in 1996. 
[note: 18]. In this article, the rate used to describe the calculation of 
daylight overdraft fees is expressed on a twenty-four-hour, annualized 
basis. When daylight overdraft fees are calculated, however, the 
annual rate is converted to an effective annual rate by multiplying it by 
the fraction of the day that Fedwire is scheduled to operate. For 
example, the current effective annual rate is 27 basis points—36 basis 
points multiplied by 18/24 because Fedwire is scheduled to operate 
eighteen hours per day. [end of note.] 
The 
Board's goal was to induce behavior that would 
reduce risk and increase efficiency in the payment 
system. 
During the comment period in 1991, some deposi-
tory institutions and securities dealers stated that they 
opposed a fee on securities-related overdrafts that 
were collateralized. They argued that collateral pro-
tected the Federal Reserve against losses and that 
there are costs associated with pledging collateral. 
Thus, the combination of pricing and requiring collat-
eral for securities-related overdrafts would be unduly 
burdensome. In the 1992 policy, the Board stated, 
however, that allowing collateral to substitute for 
daylight overdraft fees would not provide a mean-
ingful incentive for depository institutions or their 
securities-dealer customers to change their settlement 
practices and reduce daylight overdrafts. The Board 
also stated that collateral is required for institutions 
with large government securities overdrafts as an 
exception that permits them to exceed their net 
debit caps because of the difficulty of controlling 
securities-related overdrafts. 
In March 1995, the Board decided to raise the 
daylight overdraft fee to 36 basis points instead of 
48 basis points. 
[note:] 19. 60 Fed. Reg. 12559 (March 7, 1995). [end of note.] 
Because aggregate daylight over-
drafts had fallen about 40 percent after the introduc-
tion of fees, the Board was concerned that raising the 
fee to 48 basis points might produce undesirable 
market effects contrary to the objectives of its risk-
control program. The Board, nonetheless, believed 
that some increase in the rate charged on daylight 
overdrafts was needed to provide additional incen-
tives for institutions to reduce daylight overdrafts 
related to funds transfers and stated that it would 
consider future fee increases. 
Recent Review of the Board's Intraday Credit 
Policies. 
In early 2000, the Board recognized that significant 
changes had occurred in the banking, payments, and 
regulatory environment in the past few years and, as 
a result, decided to conduct a broad review of its 
daylight credit policies. (For a brief description of 
the issues covered in the policy review, see the box 
''Components of the Federal Reserve's Policy State-
ment on Payments System Risk.'') During its review, 
the Board evaluated the effectiveness of the current 
daylight credit policies and determined that these 
policies are generally effective in controlling risk 
to the Federal Reserve and in creating incentives for 
depository institutions to manage their intraday credit 
exposures. In addition, the Board determined that 
the industry understands the current policy and that 
private-sector participants generally have benefited 
from the policy's risk controls. The Board also recog-
nized, however, that the policy has imposed costs on 
the industry and is considered burdensome by some 
depository institutions. 
In conducting its review, the Board evaluated the 
impact of past policy actions on depository insti-
tutions' behavior and on the markets generally. The 
Board also considered the effects of payment system 
initiatives on payment activity and the demand for 
daylight credit. Although the Board believed that the 
current policy was generally effective, it identified 
growing liquidity pressures among certain payment 
system participants. Specifically, the Board learned 
that a small number of financially healthy institutions 
regularly found their net debit caps to be constrain-
ing, a condition that caused them to delay sending 
payments and, in some cases, to turn away busi-
ness. 
[note: 20]. Current net debit cap levels provide sufficient liquidity for 
the majority of depository institutions: Approximately 97 percent 
of depository institutions with positive net debit caps use less than 
50 percent of their daylight overdraft capacity for their average daily 
peak overdrafts. [end of note.] 
Furthermore, recent payment system initia-
tives, such as CHIPS with intraday finality (new 
CHIPS), the Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS) 
bank, and settlement-day finality for Federal Reserve-
processed ACH credit transactions, may exacerbate these institutions' liquidity needs at specific times 
during the day. 
[note: 21]. New CHIPS was implemented on January 22, 2001; CLS is 
scheduled to begin live operations in mid-2002; and Federal Reserve-
processed ACH credit transactions began receiving settlement-day 
finality on June 25, 2001. Settlement-day finality for ACH credit 
transactions may exacerbate liquidity pressures for credit originators 
that must prefund the settlement amount for these transactions. [end of note.] 
As a result of the review, the Board requested 
comment on an interim policy statement that allowed, 
subject to Reserve Bank approval, certain depository 
institutions with self-assessed net debit caps to pledge 
collateral to access additional daylight overdraft 
capacity. 
[note: 22]. 66 Fed. Reg. 30199 (June 5, 2001). Available on line at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov / boarddocs / press / boardacts / 2001 / 
20010530/default.htm. [end of note.] 
Depository institutions with exempt-from-
filing and de minimis net debit caps would have to 
obtain a self-assessed net debit cap to access addi-
tional daylight overdraft capacity through pledging 
collateral. 
[beginning of box:] Components of the Federal Reserve's Policy 
Statement on Payments System Risk 
The Policy Statement on Payments System Risk com-
prises three sections. The first section addresses the risks 
to the Federal Reserve Banks in extending daylight credit 
to depository institutions. The second section establishes 
policies and procedures for private-sector payment 
systems and was updated in 1998 to integrate several 
of the Board's policies on payment system risk into a 
more comprehensive and consistent framework. 
[note: 1]. 63 Fed. Reg. 34888 (June 26, 1998). [end of note.] 
The 
1998 revisions were intended to provide a flexible, risk-
based approach to risk management in multilateral set-
tlement arrangements and not to mandate uniform, rigid 
requirements for all systems. The last section of the 
policy describes the Board's support of market inno-
vations, such as rollovers or continuing contracts, that 
reduce daylight overdrafts in Federal Reserve accounts. 
The Board's recent review of its PSR policy focused 
solely on the first section of the policy and included the 
following topics: 
• Daylight overdraft measurement (posting rules) 
• Pricing 
• U.S.-chartered institutions' capital 
• U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks' capital 
• Net debit caps 
• Book-entry government securities transactions (collat-
eralization and transfer-size limit) 
• Fedwire third-party access 
• Interaffiliate transfers 
[note: 2]. As a result of its review, the Board rescinded the third-party access 
policy (66 Fed. Reg. 19165 [April 13, 2001]) and the interaffiliate transfer 
policy (66 Fed. Reg. 30198 [June 5, 2001]). [end of note.] [end of box.] 
• Real-time monitoring 
• Ex post monitoring 
At the same time, the Board also requested com-
ment on a package of nearer-term proposals pertain-
ing to its daylight credit policies. 
[note: 23]. 66 Fed. Reg. 30205, 30195, and 30193 (June 5, 2001). 
Available on line at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/ 
boardacts/2001/20010530/default.htm. [end of note.] 
One proposal was 
to increase the percentage of capital used in cal-
culating net debit caps for most U.S. branches and 
agencies of foreign banks to recognize the current 
supervisory environment and the need for intraday 
liquidity. Another proposal was to modify the post-
ing time of electronic check presentments (ECP) to 
depository institutions' Federal Reserve accounts for 
purposes of measuring daylight overdrafts to remove 
an impediment to the greater use of ECP. The Board 
also proposed retaining the current $50 million gov-
ernment securities transfer limit to support process-
ing efficiencies in the government securities market. 
The Board also sought industry feedback on the 
benefits and drawbacks of several possible longer-
term changes to the PSR policy 
[note: 24]. 66 Fed. Reg. 30208 (June 5, 2001). Available on line 
at http: // www.federalreserve.gov / boarddocs / press / boardacts / 2001/ 
20010530/default.htm. [end of note.] 
These changes 
included lowering self-assessed, single-day net debit 
caps, eliminating the two-week average caps, imple-
menting differential pricing for collateralized and 
uncollateralized daylight overdrafts, and rejecting 
payments with settlement-day finality that would 
cause an institution to exceed its total collateralized 
and uncollateralized daylight overdraft capacity. 
After considering commenters' responses to the 
nearer-term proposals, the Board modified the PSR 
policy in December 2001 to reflect an increase in the 
percentage of capital used in calculating net debit 
caps for most U.S. branches and agencies of foreign 
banks (from 10 percent to as much as 35 percent), 
a modified posting time of 1:00 p.m. local time for 
electronic check presentments, and adoption of the 
interim policy statement. 
[note: 25]. 66 Fed. Reg. 64419 (December 13, 2001). Available on line 
at http: // www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs /press /boardacts /2001/ 
20011211/default.htm. [end of note.] 
In addition, in response to 
its analysis and the industry's comments, the Board 
decided to retain the $50 million limit on individual 
government securities transfers. 
The Board's adoption of a policy that allows some 
depository institutions to pledge collateral to access 
additional daylight overdraft capacity is a signifi-
cant change from past policy actions. The Board's 
analysis of daylight overdraft levels, liquidity pat-terns, and payment system developments revealed 
that, although net debit caps provide sufficient liquid-
ity for most institutions, some depository institutions 
experience liquidity pressures. The Board believes 
that requiring collateral for additional daylight over-
draft capacity will allow the Federal Reserve to 
protect the public sector from additional risk while 
providing extra liquidity to the few institutions that 
might otherwise be unduly constrained. Furthermore, 
providing extra liquidity to constrained institutions 
should help prevent liquidity-related market disrup-
tions. The Board stated that the option to pledge 
collateral for additional daylight overdraft capacity 
would provide the private sector with the flexibility 
that it requested to relieve liquidity pressures that 
have arisen or may arise from new CHIPS, CLS, 
ACH finality, or other risk-reducing payment system 
initiatives. 
TRENDS IN DAYLIGHT OVERDRAFT AND 
PAYMENT ACTIVITY. 
During the recent review, Federal Reserve staff mem-
bers assessed several measures of depository insti-
tutions' use of Federal Reserve intraday credit and 
payment activity to identify possible changes to the 
policy that could improve its effectiveness. Spe-
cifically, they examined Federal Reserve payment 
activity and related daylight overdrafts, historical 
and current daylight overdraft levels, the effects of 
pricing overdrafts, and the distribution of daylight 
overdrafts. 
[note: 26]. Quarterly data presented in this article extend through the 
second quarter of 2001. Although third-quarter data for 2001 were 
available, these data were not included because of anomalies resulting 
from the events of September 11. [end of note.] 
Federal Reserve Payment Activity 
and Related Daylight Overdrafts. 
The Federal Reserve Banks processed more than 
$2.4 trillion in payments per day in 2000, including 
funds and securities transfers, net settlement trans-
actions, checks, ACH transactions, and cash deposits 
and withdrawals. If an institution had insufficient 
balances in its Federal Reserve account to cover any 
debits, the institution would have incurred daylight 
overdrafts unless the payment was rejected and not 
posted to its account. Because depository institutions 
on average hold relatively small amounts overnight 
in their Federal Reserve accounts (only $13 billion in 
2000), many use Federal Reserve daylight credit to 
cover their intraday debits. 
Although the Federal Reserve processes 175 times 
more checks and ACH transactions by volume than 
Fedwire funds and securities transfers, Fedwire trans-
fers represent almost 95 percent of the value of 
transactions posted to institutions' Federal Reserve 
accounts (table 3). Similarly, Fedwire funds and secu-
rities transfers are the major source of institutions' 
daylight overdrafts. Fedwire funds transfers in 2000 
generated about 70 percent of the value of average 
daylight overdrafts, and government securities trans-
fers represented just under 20 percent. ''Other'' activ-
ity (check, ACH, cash, net settlement, and so on) 
represented about 10 percent. 
3. Value and volume of payments processed by the 
Federal Reserve, by type of payment, 2000 
Payment type  Value 
(trillions of dollars) 
Volume 
(millions of payments) 
Fedwire funds  379.8  108.3 
Government securities  180.1  13.6 
Automated clearinghouse  14.0  4,638.0 
Check  13.8  17,000.0 
The timing and value of payments processed by 
the Federal Reserve and posted to depository institu-
tions' accounts help to explain the timing and value 
of daylight overdrafts (charts 1 and 2). The average 
value of government securities transfer activity peaks 
when the book-entry securities system opens at 
8:30 a.m. Eastern Time (ET); the average value of 
funds activity peaks around 4:30 p.m., most likely 
from settlement at the Depository Trust Company 
(DTC), and again around 5:15 p.m., presumably from 
institutions funding their end-of-day positions in 
CHIPS. The Federal Reserve provides settlement ser-
vices to both of these entities. 
According to the PSR posting rules, the debit side 
of a transaction should post, to the extent possible, at 
the same time as the credit side—with the exception 
of check transactions. 
[note: 27]. In developing the PSR posting rules, four general principles 
were established. First, the posting rules were designed so as not to 
generate intraday float. Second, they were to permit depository insti-
tutions to anticipate precisely when transactions would be posted to 
their account. Third, they were to be consistent with the legal rights 
and responsibilities of depository institutions. Under this principle, 
check debits would not be posted to an institution' s account before 
presentment of the checks. Finally, they were designed so as not to 
create a competitive advantage for the Federal Reserve Banks or for 
private-sector service providers. [end of note.] 
Because of the nature of 
paper check processing, matching debits and credits 
on a transaction-by-transaction basis throughout the day is not practicable. As a result, debits for checks 
presented to depository institutions are posted on the 
next clock hour at least one hour after presentment, 
beginning at 11:00 a.m. ET. Credits for check depos-
its are posted either (1) at a single, float-weighted 
posting time or (2) at multiple times throughout 
the day, beginning at 11:00 a.m. ET, using a set of 
fractions that are based upon Reserve Bank check 
collection experience. 
[note: 28]. Institutions must choose one of two check credit posting 
options, (1) all credits posted at a single, float-weighted posting time 
or (2) fractional credits posted throughout the day. The first option 
allows an institution to receive all of its check credits at a single time 
for each type of cash letter. This time may not necessarily fall on a 
clock hour. The second option permits an institution to receive a 
portion of its available check credits on the clock hours between 
11:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. ET. The option selected applies to all of an 
institution's check deposits. Reserve Banks calculate crediting frac-
tions and float-weighted posting times for each time zone based on 
surveys of the times at which they present checks to depository 
institutions for collection. [end of note.] 
The earliest float-weighted 
posting time, which enables an institution to have full 
use of its check deposit credits, is 11:45 a.m. ET. 
Chart 1. Average value of Fedwire funds and book-entry securities activity, by time of day, August 2001 
[graph plotting two lines: book entry securities and funds from 8:00 to 18:30 eastern time. At 8:00, book-entry securities were about $0 and Funds  about $.5 billion. Right before 8:30 book-entry securities shoots up to about $75 billion, funds stays at about $.5 billion. By 8:45 book-entry-securities  is down to about $2 billion, Funds is still about $.5 billion. Both lines are small jaggs, book-entry securities varies about $2 billion, Funds about $.25  billion. Book-entry securities stays at about $2 billion until it spikes up to about $6 billion at 14:00, then tends down, reaching around $0 by 15:15.  Funds has been gently tending upwards, reaching about $2 billion at 14:00, $3 billion at 15:00, and $6 billion at 16:00. At 16:30 it is up to about $11  billion. Just before 17:00 it is down to about $5 billion. At around 17:15 Funds peaks at about $17 billion. Then it slides down, reaching around $6 '  billion at 17:30 and $0 by 18:30.] 
NOTE. Monthly averages of daily data at one-minute intervals during scheduled Fedwire hours of operation. 
chart 2. Value of all other payment activity, by time of day, August 2001 
[bar graph of debts and credits from 8:30 until 18:30 eastern time. At 8:30 Debits were about $25 billion, credits about $34 billion. At 9:00 they  were both about $1.5 billion. At 9.30 they were both about $0.5 billion. At 10:00 Debits was about $0.5 billion and Credits about $2 billion. At  10:30 Debits were about $0.5 billion, credits about $0. At 11:00 Debits is about $47 billion, credits about $32 billion. At 11:30 debits is about  $1 billion, credits about $22 billion. At 12:00 debits is about $8 billion, credits about $15 billion. At 12:30 debits is about $2 billion, credits about  $8.5 billion. At 13:00 debits is about $11.5 billion, credit about $9 billion. At 13:30 debits is about $0.5 billion, credits about $3 billion. At 14:00  debits is about $9 million, credits about $6 billion. At 14:30 both are about $2 billion. At 15:00 debits is about $4 billion, credits about $5 billion. At  15:30 both are about $0.5 billion. At 16:00 debits is about $7 billion, credits about $3 billion. At 16:30 both are about $1 billion. At 17:00 debits  is about $2 billion, credits about $1 billion, At 17:30 both are about $0.5 billion. At 18:00 both are about $0.5 billion. At 18:30 Debits is about  $41 billion, Credits about $36.5 billion.] 
NOTE. Monthly averages of daily data at thirty-minute intervals. Debit and credit posting times are based on the PSR posting rules. 
At 11:00 a.m. ET the Federal Reserve Banks 
debit institutions' accounts for almost $50 billion, on 
average, for other payment activity, of which about 
$20 billion represents checks. At the same time, they 
credit institutions' accounts for just over $30 billion, 
of which only about $5 billion represents checks 
(chart 2). During most of the day, the check posting 
rules result in a minimal amount of intraday check 
float; however, they appear to be causing as much as 
$15 billion in intraday float between 11:00 a.m. and 
11:45 a.m. ET. This float occurs because the Reserve 
Banks have posted debits to depository institutions' 
accounts before providing corresponding credits on 
check transactions to other institutions. These check 
debits create a spike in daylight overdrafts that 
lasts approximately forty-five minutes, until the ear-
liest float-weighted posting time of 11:45 a.m. ET 
(chart 7). Effects of Fees 
on Daylight Overdraft Levels. 
Between the implementation of net debit caps in 
March 1986 and daylight overdraft pricing in April 
1994, peak and average daylight overdrafts in Fed-
eral Reserve accounts increased almost continuously 
(see charts 3 and 4 and the box ''Measuring Daylight 
Overdrafts: Peak and Average''). Between 1986 and 
1988, peak and average daylight overdrafts grew just 
slightly. Between 1989 and 1993, however, daylight 
overdrafts increased dramatically, despite the 1988 
reduction in net debit caps. Also, during the same 
period, securities-related overdrafts more than 
doubled, accounting for most of the growth in total 
daylight overdrafts. 
Chart 3. Peak daylight overdrafts, 1986:Q1-2001:Q2 
[Graph plotting three lines: total, securities, and funds from 1986 through the first half of 2001. In the beginning of 1986, Total was  about $60 billion, Securities about $36 billion, Funds about $33 billion. In January 1988 (first reduction in net debit caps) total was  about $65 billion, Securities and funds about $35 billion. On May 1988 (second reduction in net debit caps) Total was about  $62 billion, Securities and Funds about $35 billion. On January 1991 (Securities-related overdrafts included in net debit caps) total  was about $105 billion, Securities about $72 billion, Funds about $47 billion. Mid 1993 Total was about $132, Securities about  $110 billion, Funds about $50 billion. In April 1994 (fees introduced at an annual rate of 24 basis points) Total was about $80 billion,  Securities about $70 billion, Funds about $45 billion. In April 1995 (fees raised to an annual rate of 36 basis points) Total was about  $67 billion, Securities about $62 billion, Funds about $45 billion. About the beginning of 1998, Total was about $78 billion,  Securities about $58 billion, Funds about $62 billion. Mid 2001 Total was about $98 billion, Securities about $30 billion, Funds  about $72 billion.] 
NOTE. Quarterly averages of daily data. For definition of ''peak'' daylight 
overdrafts, see box ''Measuring Daylight Overdrafts: Peak and Average.'' 
Chart 4. Average daylight overdrafts, 1986:Q1-2001:Q2 
[Graph plotting three lines: total, securities, and funds from 1986 through the first half of 2001. In the beginning of 1986, Total was  about $16 billion, Securities about $7 billion, Funds about $9 billion. In January 1988 (first reduction in net debit caps) total was  about $18 billion, Securities about $9 billion and funds about $10 billion. On May 1988 (second reduction in net debit caps) Total  was about $17 billion, Securities about $8 and Funds about $11 billion. On January 1991 (Securities-related overdrafts included in  net debit caps) total was about $28 billion, Securities about $15 billion, Funds about $13 billion. Mid 1993 Total was about $40  billion, Securities about  $27 billion, Funds about $15 billion. In April 1994 (fees introduced at an annual rate of 24 basis points) Total was about $27 billion,  Securities about $15 billion, Funds about $12 billion. In April 1995 (fees raised to an annual rate of 36 basis points) Total was about  $23.4 billion, Securities and Funds about $2 billion. About the beginning of 1998, Total was about $30 billion,  Securities about $12 billion, Funds about $19 billion. Mid 2001 Total was about $33 billion, Securities about $6 billion, Funds  about $27 billion.] 
NOTE. Quarterly averages of daily data. For definition of ''average'' daylight 
overdrafts, see box ''Measuring Daylight Overdrafts: Peak and Average.'' 
Within one year of the implementation on April 14, 
1994, of daylight overdraft fees, total average day-
light overdrafts had dropped 40 percent, mostly 
because of decreases in securities-related overdrafts 
(chart 4). 
[note: 29]. One year after the implementation of daylight overdraft fees, 
securities-related overdrafts had dropped more than 50 percent while 
funds-related overdrafts had declined about 15 percent. [end of note.] 
Funds-related overdrafts declined slightly 
after the implementation of fees; however, they began 
to rise again even before the 1995 fee increase. 
Within one year of the increase, average funds-
related overdrafts were up more than 15 percent 
and continued to grow thereafter, while securities-
related overdrafts continued to trend down. The growth in funds-related overdrafts appears to be 
directly related to the growth in large-value funds 
transfers (chart 5). 
[beginning of box:] Measuring Daylight Overdrafts: 
Peak and Average. 
To determine an individual depository institution's com-
pliance with certain Federal Reserve Board policies and 
to assess the aggregate amount of daylight credit it 
extends to the banking system, the Federal Reserve mea-
sures each depository institution's account balance at the 
end of each minute during the business day. An institu-
tion's average daily daylight overdraft is calculated by 
dividing the sum of its negative Federal Reserve account 
balances at the end of each minute of the scheduled 
Fedwire operating day (with positive balances set to 
zero) by the total number of minutes in the scheduled 
Fedwire operating day. 
Individual Measures. 
An institution's peak daylight overdraft for a given day is 
its largest negative end-of-minute balance. Similarly, an 
institution's average daylight overdraft for a given day is 
calculated by summing any negative end-of-minute bal-
ances incurred during the standard operating day of the 
Fedwire funds transfer system and dividing this amount 
by the number of minutes in the standard Fedwire operat-
ing day. 
Aggregate Measures. 
The aggregate average daylight overdraft for a given day 
is simply the sum of all depository institutions' average 
daylight overdrafts on that day. The aggregate peak day-
light overdraft is determined by adding the account bal-
ances of all depository institutions in a negative position 
for each minute during the day and then selecting the 
largest negative end-of-minute balance. The composite 
peak daylight overdraft is determined by adding all insti-
tutions' individual peak daylight overdrafts, regardless of 
whether those peaks occur at the same time. The Board 
does not generally use the composite peak measure in its 
analyses. [end of box.] 
Chart 5. Annual transaction values for CHIPS and for Fedwire 
funds and book-entry securities, 1987-2000 
[graph plotting three lines: CHIPS, fedwire funds, and fedwire securities  from 1987 through 2000. In 1987 Chips and fedwire funds was about  $140 trillion, Fedwire securities about $80 trillion. 1991 chips was about  $220 trillion, funds about $190 trillion, securities about $120 trillion. In  1997 Chips was about $360 trillion, funds about $290 trillion, securities  about $175 trillion. In 2000 chips was about $290 trillion, funds was  about $380 trillion, securities about $190 trillion.] 
NOTE. The decrease in CHIPS activity between 1997 and 1998 is likely a 
result of the decrease in Asian market activity, while the decline between 1998 
and 1999 may be due to the introduction of the euro in January 1999. 
Even though funds-related overdrafts have grown 
substantially since 1995, the ratio of the average 
value of funds-related overdrafts to Fedwire funds 
transfers has remained relatively constant at approxi-
mately 1.5 percent (chart 6). In contrast, the average 
value of securities-related overdrafts as a percentage 
of securities transfers has continued to decrease since 
the implementation of fees, from 2.5 percent to less 
than 1.0 percent. Furthermore, on an annual average 
basis, the aggregate value of funds-related overdrafts 
has grown approximately 18 percent per year, a rate 
slightly higher than that of the aggregate value of 
Fedwire funds activity, which has been about 15 per-
cent per year. The aggregate value of securities-
related overdrafts has decreased almost 10 percent 
per year, in contrast to the 5 percent yearly increase 
in the aggregate value of book-entry activity. 
Chart 6. Average daylight overdrafts as a percentage 
of Fedwire transfers, 1994:Q2-2001:Q2 
[graph plotting two lines: book-entry securities and funds  from 1994 through the beginning of 2001. Book-entry  securities starts at about 2.5%, funds at about 1.4%.  At the beginning of 2001 book-entry securities ends at  0.7%, Funds at about 1.65%.] 
NOTE. Quarterly averages of daily data. 
The introduction of daylight overdraft fees likely 
affected securities-related overdrafts more signifi-
cantly than funds-related overdrafts for several 
reasons. First, only a small number of depository 
institutions (referred to as ''clearing banks'') clear 
government securities, so daylight overdraft fees 
resulting from government securities transfers were 
highly concentrated among a few institutions. Sec-
ond, most clearing banks decided to pass on their 
daylight overdraft charges to their securities-dealer 
customers. In doing so, they provided their cus-tomers with an economic incentive to modify their 
behavior. Finally, the Board's $50 million limit on 
the size of individual government securities trans-
actions prompted the industry to change its delivery 
guidelines, which, before the limit, required dealers 
to deliver trade obligations in full. By building the 
necessary securities inventory to deliver trade obliga-
tions in full, securities dealers incurred large daylight 
overdrafts with their clearing banks. 
Because government securities dealers tended to 
rely heavily on intraday credit to conduct their trans-
actions, the daylight overdraft fee provided a strong 
incentive for dealers to send securities earlier in the 
day. In addition, the limit required dealers' counter-
parties to accept (and pay for) partial deliveries of 
very large orders in $50 million increments. In par-
ticular, after the Federal Reserve implemented day-
light overdraft fees, securities dealers modified their 
market practices by arranging financing and deliver-
ing securities used as collateral for repurchase agree-
ments (repos) as early in the morning as possible. 
[Note: 30]. For more information, see Heidi Willmann Richards, "Day-
light Overdraft Fees and the Federal Reserve's Payment System 
Risk Policy,'' Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 81 (December 1995), 
pp. 1065-77. [end of note.] 
Because a significant portion of securities transfers is 
related to daily repo activity, securities-related over-
drafts decreased substantially. In sum, fees provided 
a strong incentive for securities dealers to adopt 
practices that reduced the use of intraday credit and 
thus reduced exposures and risks to the Federal 
Reserve; without fees they had little incentive to 
change repo settlement practices. 
Fees also had a notable effect on the intraday 
pattern and composition of overdrafts. Daylight over-
draft data by time of day show the considerable shift 
in the timing and the decrease in the aggregate value 
of securities-related overdrafts. Before daylight over-
draft fees, the peak daylight overdraft for the banking 
industry was approximately $125 billion. This peak 
occurred between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. ET 
(chart 7) and was mainly a result of securities-related 
overdrafts (chart 8). Today, however, funds daylight 
overdrafts represent the majority of the total, and 
the peak of approximately $90 billion now occurs 
around 4:30 p.m. ET (chart 9). The timing and size 
of the peak in funds daylight overdrafts may be due, 
in part, to the large growth in settlement volumes 
at DTC, as settlement usually occurs around 
4:30 p.m. ET on the books of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York. 
Chart 7. Total daylight overdrafts, by time of day, selected years, 1994-2001 
[graph plotting four lines: 1994 before fees, 1995 before fee increase, 1998 and 2001, from 8:30 through 18:30 eastern time.  At 8:30 1994 and 1995 was about $10 billion, 1998 was about $30 billion, 2001 about $30 billion. At 9:00, 1994 was about  $75 billion, 1995 about $55 billion, 1998 about $60 billion, 2001 about $27 billion. At 11:30, 1994 was about $125 billion, 1995  about $62 billion, 1998 and 2001 about $70 billion. At 14:00, 1994 and 2001 was about $75 billion, 1995 about $50 billion, 1998  about $60 billion. At 16:00, 2001 was about $95 billion, 1998 about $65 billion, 1994 about $50 billion, 1995 about $45 billion.  At 18:30 all are about $0.] 
NOTE. Data are from a monthly sample of daily averages at one-minute intervals during scheduled Fedwire hours of operation. 
Since the Board raised the daylight overdraft fee 
in 1995, total average daylight overdrafts have grown 
more than 35 percent. This change results from a 
decrease in book-entry-related overdrafts of almost 
50 percent and an increase in funds-related overdrafts 
of 110 percent. More than one-third of the growth 
in total average daylight overdrafts has occurred since 
early 2000. 
Growth in financial market activity may account 
for the recent increase in overdrafts. The expansion 
of the global economy, the tremendous growth in 
transaction levels in both domestic and cross-border 
markets, and the emergence of electronic trading 
vehicles in recent years greatly increased securities-
related payments. 
[note: 31]. Securities Industry Association, ''Institutional Transaction 
Processing Committee White Paper'' (December 1, 1999). [end of note.] 
Because the Depository Trust & Clearing Cor-
poration (DTCC) clears and settles almost all trades of equities, corporate bonds, and municipal debt, 
changes in trading activity can have a significant 
effect on the value of settlement payments made over 
Fedwire by DTCC's members. 
[Note: 32]. The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation oversees two 
principal subsidiaries, the Depository Trust Company and the National 
Securities Clearing Corporation, which provide the primary infrastruc-
ture for the clearance and settlement of the vast majority of equity, 
corporate debt, and municipal bond transactions in the United States. [end of note.] 
For example, 
DTCC's clearing corporations processed 11.1 million 
transactions per day on average in 2000, a 76 percent 
increase over 1999 levels (table 4), while between 
1999 and 2000, the daily average volume of trades 
on Nasdaq and on the New York Stock Exchange 
grew approximately 62 percent and 28 percent 
respectively. 
[Note: 33]. See the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, Annual 
Report, 2000 (www.dtcc.com/2000annual/ns/clearance.htm) and The 
Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. (http://www.marketdata.nasdaq.com/asp/ 
Sec1Summary. asp). [end of note.] 
The average daily value of trans-
actions processed by DTCC's subsidiaries grew to 
$421 billion in 2000, up from $280 billion in 1999 
(table 4). This increase in transactions may help to 
explain the tremendous growth in Fedwire funds 
transfers and funds-related daylight overdrafts in 
2000. 
Chart 8. Book-entry daylight overdrafts, by time of day, selected years, 1994-2001 
[graph plotting four lines: 1994 before fees, 1995 before fee increase, 1998 and 2001, from 8:30 through 18:30 eastern time.  At 8:30, 1994 and 1995 was about $10 billion, 1998 about $23 billion, 2001 about $15 billion. At 9:00 1994 was about $70 billion,  1995 and 1998 about $50 billion, 2001 about $15 billion. At 10:00 1994 was about $87 billion, 1995 and 1998 about $52 billion,  2001 about $18 billion. At 11:30, 1994 was about $95 billion, 1995 about $40 billion, 1998 about $32 billion, 2001 about $15 billion.  At 14:00, 1994 was about $20 billion, 1995 and 2001 about $12 billion, 1998 about $10 billion. By 18:30 they were all down to  about $0.] 
NOTE. Data are from a monthly sample of daily averages at one-minute intervals during scheduled Fedwire hours of operation. 
Chart 9. Funds daylight overdrafts, by time of day, selected years, 1994-2001 
[graph plotting four lines: 1994 before fees, 1995 before fee increase, 1998 and 2001, from 8:30 through 18:30 eastern time.  At 8:30, 1994 and 1995 were about $0, 1998 about $5 billion, 2001 about $10 billion. At 11:00 there is a jump up, for 1995 about  $12 billion to $18 billion, for 1994 about $20 billion to $27 billion, for 1998 about $27 billion to $32 billion, for 2001 about  $40 billion to $49 billion. At 11:45 there is a jump down, for 1995 about $27 billion to $22 billion, for 1994 about $34 billion to  $29 billion, for 1998 about $40 billion to $32 billion, for 2001 about $56 billion to $44 billion. At 16:00 1995 is about $44 billion,  1994 about $50 billion, 1998 about $62 billion, 2001 about $83 billion. At 16:30 1995 is about $34 billion, 1994 about $39 billion,  1998 about $52 billion, 2001 about $88 billion. At 18:30 all are down to about $0.] 
NOTE. Data are from a monthly sample of daily averages at one-minute intervals during scheduled Fedwire hours of operation. 
Table 4. Value and volume of transactions processed by DTCC: 
average, peak, and percent change, 1999-2000 
Item  1999  2000 
Change 
(percent) 
DTCC transaction processing 
Value (billions of dollars): 
Average  280  421  50.4  DTCC transaction processing  Value (billions of dollars):Peak  498  722  45.0 
Volume (millions of transactions): 
Average  6.3  11.1  76.2 
Volume (millions of transactions):Peak  9.3  18.1  94.6 
Note on average: Annual average of daily figures. 
Note on DTCC Value Peak: Maximum daily value reached during the year. 
Note on Volume peak: Maximum daily volume reached during the year. 
SOURCE. Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, Annual Report, 2000. Distribution of Depository Institutions 
with Daylight Overdrafts. 
The Board expected that its PSR policy would reduce 
aggregate daylight overdrafts and the number of 
depository institutions relying on intraday credit. 
Available information seems to suggest that deposi-
tory institutions have not met either of these expecta-
tions relative to funds daylight overdrafts during the 
past several years (table 5 and charts 3 and 4). As 
mentioned previously, funds-related overdrafts have 
continued to grow since 1995. In addition, since 1994 
the percentage of Federal Reserve account holders 
that use daylight credit has not decreased signifi-
cantly and, in fact, increased slightly after pricing 
was implemented in 1994 and again when the fee was 
raised in 1995 (table 5). 
Table 5. Number and percentage of Federal Reserve account 
holders incurring overdrafts, 1994-2000 
Year  Number of 
account holders 
Account holders incurring overdrafts: 
Number 
Account holders incurring overdrafts: 
Percent of total 
1994  11,289  8,059  71 
1995  10,755  7,768  72 
1996  10,023  7,522  75 
1997  9,808  7,241  74 
1998  9,569  7,033  73 
1999  9,299  6,902  74 
2000  9,025  6,747  75 
Possibly the most compelling indication that 
depository institutions have attempted to control their 
use of Federal Reserve daylight credit is the rela-
tively constant relationship between the average 
value of funds daylight overdrafts and the value 
of Fedwire funds transfers since 1994, as described 
previously and shown in chart 6. Another compelling 
indication of lower daylight overdraft risk is the 
ratio of daylight overdrafts to risk-based capital. The 
vast majority of daylight overdrafts, approximately 
98 percent, have constituted less than 50 percent of 
the overdrafting institution's risk-based capital or 
equivalent since 1994. In the mid-1980s when the 
PSR policy was first adopted, about two-thirds of 
total daylight overdrafts were attributable to about 
twenty depository institutions that were continually 
incurring overdrafts, which were often equal to two 
or three times their capital. Today, however, less than 
1 percent of total daylight overdrafts are attributable 
to institutions that incur overdrafts exceeding their 
capital measures. Funds daylight overdrafts may now 
be at a level that cannot be reduced further without 
imposing more costs on depository institutions. 




(millions of dollars) 
1994  13.0 
1995  24.5 
1996  28.2 
1997  28.8 
1998  32.8 
1999  26.2 
2000  25.2 
Chart 10. Distribution of depository institutions that pay daylight overdraft fees, by annual fee amount, 1994-2000 
[bar graph plotting the number of institutions that pay fees in the years 1994 through 2000, sorted by annual fee amount.  For fees less than $1000, there were about 195 institutions in 1994, about 215 in 1995, about 225 in 1996, about 220 in 1997,  about 245 in 1998, about 190 in 1999 and 2000. For fees $1001 to $10000, there were about 60 institutions in 1994, about 85 in  1995, about 70 in 1996, about 75 in 1997, about 60 in 1998, about 55 in 1999, about 65 in 2000. For fees $10001 to $50000, there  were about 40 institutions in 1994, about 35 in 1995, 1996, and 1997, about 30 in 1998, about 25 in 1999 and 2000. For  fees $50001 to $100000, there were about 10 institutions in 1994, about 20 in 1995, about 15 in 1996, about 20 in 1997 though  2000. For fees more than $100001, there were about 10 institutions in 1994, about 15 in 1995, about 25 in 1996, about 20 in 1997,  about 25 in 1998 though 2000.] 
Although thousands of institutions use daylight 
credit throughout the year to support their payment 
activity (table 5), very few pay daylight overdraft 
fees. Since the Federal Reserve began pricing day-
light overdrafts in 1994, on average only about 
350 depository institutions have paid fees in a given 
year. Most of these institutions pay less than 
$1,000 per year, and the distribution of those that 
pay more has not changed substantially since 1994 
(chart 10). Aggregate fees paid by depository institu-
tions dropped 20 percent between 1998 and 1999, 
likely as a result of a few large institutions' efforts to reduce their average daylight overdrafts and related 
fees and depository institutions' consolidation of 
multiple charters and their corresponding Federal 
Reserve accounts under interstate branch banking 
(table 6). 
[note: 34]. In January 1998, the Federal Reserve implemented a new 
account structure to support the account management and information 
needs of depository institutions in an interstate branching environ-
ment. Under the new account structure, the Federal Reserve provides 
separately chartered institutions with one master account and the 
option of establishing subaccounts that can be used to segregate 
transaction information according to certain criteria, such as type of 
transaction.[end of note.] 
POSSIBLE FUTURE POLICY DIRECTION. 
During the review of the PSR policy, Federal Reserve 
staff explored several options for changes that 
might improve the policy's effectiveness. The policy 
options considered were varied and comprised those 
issued for comment in June 2001 and a few others— 
including requiring all or a portion of an institution's 
daylight credit use to be collateralized, a requirement 
of the payment system policies of many foreign 
central banks. 
[note: 35]. The policy options identified in the Board's request for com-
ment on a possible longer-term policy direction (lowering self-
assessed, single-day net debit caps, eliminating the two-week average 
caps, implementing differential pricing for collateralized and uncollat-
eralized daylight overdrafts, and rejecting payments with settlement-
day finality that would cause an institution to exceed its total collater-
alized and uncollateralized daylight overdraft capacity) will require 
additional analysis before final action can be taken. [end of note.] 
The Board may want to evaluate not 
only the policy options described in the request for 
comment but also other options in light of the liquid-
ity issues that resulted from operational difficulties 
caused by the events of September 11, 2001. 
Effect of September 11 Events on Payment 
Activity and Federal Reserve Credit Extensions. 
For several days after the terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Center, problems with telecommunica-
tions and connections among financial market partici-
pants and payment systems (connectivity) hindered 
some institutions' ability to initiate or to act upon 
payment instructions, creating marketwide liquidity 
dislocations. In particular, some institutions were 
unable to meet their daily payment obligations, 
including covering their daylight overdraft positions, 
through their normal channels. 
[note: 36]. The Federal Reserve waived daylight overdraft fees for the 
period of Tuesday, September 11, through Friday, September 21, for 
all account holders. [end of note.] 
To inject funds 
into the financial system in the days following the 
attack, the Federal Reserve used primarily short-term 
open market operations and the discount window. 
[note: 37]. To further facilitate the functioning of financial markets and 
provide liquidity in dollars to foreign institutions, the Federal Reserve 
entered into swap arrangements with the European Central Bank 
(ECB), the Bank of Canada, and the Bank of England. The Federal 
Reserve and the ECB swap arrangement allowed the ECB to draw up 
to $50 billion in exchange for an equivalent amount of euro deposits. 
The Federal Reserve and the Bank of Canada agreed to a temporary 
augmentation of their existing swap facility to facilitate the function-
ing of financial markets and provide liquidity in U.S. dollars. Under 
the terms of the augmented facility, the Bank of Canada was able to 
draw up to $10 billion in exchange for Canadian dollars. The terms 
of the facility with the Bank of England allowed it to draw up to 
$30 billion in exchange for sterling. [end of note.] 
In fact, Federal Reserve open market operations, 
discount window lending, overnight overdrafts, and 
float increased dramatically in the days immediately 
after September 11 as depository institutions sought 
liquidity. 
Although the Federal Reserve provided billions of 
dollars to depository institutions to alleviate liquidity 
concerns, connectivity problems and the closure of 
key markets made it difficult for some institutions 
to exchange payments and lend or borrow funds. As 
a result, payments could not flow effectively through 
the banking system, and many depository insti-
tutions incurred larger-than-usual daylight over-
drafts. Between September 11 and September 21, 
peak and average daylight overdrafts that depository 
institutions incurred were approximately 36 percent 
and 32 percent higher, respectively, than levels in 
August 2001 (table 7). Daylight overdrafts peaked at 
$150 billion on September 14, their highest level ever 
and more than 60 percent higher than usual, despite 
Federal Reserve opening account balances of slightly 
more than $120 billion. 
As further evidence of institutions' connectivity 
and associated liquidity difficulties, the aggregate 
number of transfers processed over the Fedwire funds 
and securities transfer systems declined on Septem-
ber 11 and remained low for the rest of the week. In 
addition, the aggregate value of payments transferred 
over Fedwire on September 11 was $1.8 trillion, 
almost $1 trillion less than the average for August 
2001 (table 8). Although the aggregate value of pay-
ments over the Fedwire funds transfer system quickly 
returned to August 2001 levels and actually reached 
higher-than-average values for several days, the value 
of activity on the securities transfer system remained 
low into the week of September 17. 
Because of connectivity problems, depository insti-
tutions were unable to gain access to some of their 
usual sources of funding, causing delays in pay-
ments and settlements. As a result, funds built up at 
a few depository institutions that could not send out funds. Consequently, many institutions that did 
not receive expected funds had to cover their posi-
tions through Federal Reserve open market opera-
tions, overnight overdrafts, or discount window 
loans. Overnight overdrafts increased from an aver-
age of $9 million in August 2001 to more than 
$4 billion on September 12. Discount window loans 
rose from around $200 million to about $45 billion 
on September 12; later, when markets began to func-
tion better, Federal Reserve open market operations 
increased from $25 billion to nearly $100 billion. 
The Federal Reserve moved quickly after Septem-
ber 11 to ensure financial market liquidity through 
record lending at the discount window and the injec-
tion of funds through open market operations. Never-
theless, the Federal Reserve, in conjunction with 
financial market participants, is evaluating its poli-
cies and procedures regarding the payment system. 
In particular, as part of this evaluation, the Federal 
Reserve may want to reassess whether a full- or 
partial-collateralization policy for intraday credit 
could better facilitate the Federal Reserve Banks' 
actions during a crisis and protect the Banks from 
risk. 
Table 7. Depository institutions' peak and average daylight overdrafts for September 10-21, 2001, 
compared with August 2001 














August 2001 Monthly averages of daily data.  92.9  32.8  85.7  25.3  31.9  7.5 
2001—Sept. 10  98.7  37.0  87.0  29.4  27.1  7.6 
Sept. 11  113.7  45.0  103.9  32.8  31.2  12.2 
Sept. 12  113.9  36.7  90.3  27.7  37.2  9.0 
Sept. 13  120.5  41.2  104.4  34.0  24.1  7.2 
Sept. 14  150.1  54.6  116.1  45.3  36.9  9.3 
Sept. 17  121.7  34.3  115.3  31.9  22.4  2.4 
Sept. 18  125.0  38.1  115.5  33.3  16.0  4.8 
Sept. 19  130.5  46.2  117.6  37.0  27.5  9.2 
Sept. 20  127.6  44.7  116.5  35.0  42.3  9.7 
Sept. 21  132.6  49.7  126.9  40.7  42.5  9.0 
NOTE. For definition of ''peak'' and ''average'' daylight overdrafts, see box 
''Measuring Daylight Overdrafts: Peak and Average.'' 
Table 8. Daily transaction values and volumes of 
Fedwire funds and book-entry securities transfers for 


















August 2001 Monthly averages of daily data.  1,601  428,750  1,028  53,639 
2001—Sept. 10  1,591  436,312  951  44,423 
Sept. 11  1,216  249,472  563  23,221 
Sept. 12  1,696  332,433  406  18,679 
Sept. 13  1,952  376,937  681  26,046 
Sept. 14  2,009  423,256  712  22,864 
Sept. 17  2,312  462,522  1,024  170,658 
Sept. 18  1,978  419,126  805  51,058 
Sept. 19  1,836  401,420  688  47,308 
Sept. 20  1,921  433,771  808  71,534 
Sept. 21  1,832  442,293  715  42,164 
Evaluation of a Full- or Partial-
Collateralization Policy. 
In assessing the effectiveness of certain options con-
sidered during the PSR policy review, Federal 
Reserve staff evaluated the options against the objec-
tive of attaining an efficient balance among the 
benefits and the costs and risks associated with the 
provision of Federal Reserve intraday credit. The 
comprehensive costs and risks to the private sector 
of managing Federal Reserve account balances were 
also considered. To assess whether a full- or partial-
collateralization policy would more efficiently bal-
ance the costs and benefits associated with daylight 
credit than other policy options, Federal Reserve staff 
attempted to quantify those costs and benefits. Spe-
cifically, values were obtained for the amount of 
daylight credit that each depository institution used 
and the amount of collateral that each institution had 
pledged to the Federal Reserve. Although the major-
ity of depository institutions' daylight overdrafts 
are not explicitly collateralized, some of the Federal 
Reserve's intraday credit exposure is effectively 
secured by collateral already pledged. 
[note: 38]. Depository institutions desiring to access the discount window 
must sign an agreement in the Federal Reserve's Operating Circular 
No. 10, which secures both intraday and overnight overdrafts with 
collateral pledged to the Federal Reserve. After executing the appro-
priate borrowing documents, many institutions will immediately 
pledge collateral to the Federal Reserve to facilitate future requests for 
discount window loans. [end of note.] Federal Reserve staff then estimated the Federal 
Reserve's credit exposure and collateral coverage 
by comparing, institution by institution, the dollar 
amount of credit used by institutions to the value of 
collateral they held at the Federal Reserve, mainly for 
discount window purposes. 
[note: 39]. Daylight overdraft levels are daily averages based on data from 
the third quarter of 2001, excluding September 11-21, and collateral 
values are based on September 10, 2001, data. As a result, coverage 
rates are approximations only. [end of note.] 
Of about 8,500 deposi-
tory institutions that currently hold Federal Reserve 
accounts, more than 5,300 incurred daylight over-
drafts at least once during the third quarter of 2001, 
and almost 2,000 had collateral pledged to the Fed-
eral Reserve. Although less than half of the deposi-
tory institutions that incur daylight overdrafts have 
pledged collateral to the Federal Reserve, these insti-
tutions incur the vast majority of total average day-
light overdrafts (more than 90 percent) and have 
sufficient collateral to cover most of their overdrafts. 
In fact, in covering their respective daylight over-
drafts with collateral, these institutions effectively 
have collateralized 94 percent of the aggregate value 
of total average daylight overdrafts and 70 percent of 
the aggregate value of total peak daylight overdrafts. 
These institutions however, are able to cover only 
30 percent of their aggregate net debit caps with 
collateral, likely because depository institutions 
rarely use more than 50 percent of their single-day 
net debit caps for their peak daylight overdrafts. 
Although more than 5,300 depository institutions 
incurred daylight overdrafts in the third quarter of 
2001, the majority of the value was concentrated at a 
small number of very large institutions. The largest 
users of daylight credit are depository institutions 
with assets greater than $200 billion (chart 11). In 
addition, these large depository institutions generally 
have self-assessed net debit caps, which provide 
substantially more intraday credit than the exempt-
from-filing and de minimis net debit cap categories 
(chart 12). To qualify for a self-assessed net debit 
cap, however, depository institutions must implement 
risk-management controls that are proportional to the 
nature and magnitude of the risks they present. Likely 
as part of their risk-management controls, institutions 
that frequently use large amounts of daylight credit 
tend to have collateral at the Federal Reserve in the 
event operational problems or the lack of liquidity in 
the market late in the day causes their daylight over-
drafts to become overnight overdrafts. These institu-
tions would presumably rather request a discount 
window loan than pay the overnight overdraft penalty 
rate (equal to the federal funds rate plus 400 basis 
points). 
Chart 11. Distribution of depository institutions with daylight 
overdrafts and the value of daylight overdrafts incurred, 
by asset size class, 2001:Q2 
[Bar graph plotting Institutions and Value for different  asset size classes. For less than $10 billion, Institutions  were 97.7%, value 5.1%.  For 10 to $24 billion Institutions were .8%, value 5.8%.  For 25 to $49 billion Institutions were .5%, value 11.0%.  For 50 to $99 billion Institutions were .3%, value 10.6%.  For 100 to $199 billion Institutions were .2%,  value 12.5%.  For greater than $200 billion, institutions were .4%,  value 55.0%.] 
NOTE. Quarterly averages of daily data. 
chart 12. Distribution of depository institutions with daylight 
overdrafts and the value of daylight overdrafts incurred, 
by cap class, 2001:Q2 
[bar graph plotting Institutions and Value for different  cap classes. For class Zero Institutions is 5.0%, value  .2%. For class Exempt institutions is 72.2%, value .6%.  For class De minimis institutions is 19.2%, 2.7%. For  class average institutions is .7%, value 1.0%. For class  Above average institutions is 2.2%, value 55.7%.  For class high institutions is .8%, value 39.8%.] 
NOTE. Quarterly averages of daily data. 
In considering a policy that would require full 
or partial collateralization of daylight credit use, the 
most relevant issue is likely whether individual insti-
tutions can effectively cover their net debit caps or 
peak daylight overdrafts with their balance sheet 
assets that are eligible as collateral at the Federal 
Reserve. Because many depository institutions do not 
have collateral pledged to the Federal Reserve, staff 
compared each depository institution's net debit cap 
and peak daylight overdraft with its eligible balance 
sheet assets. The composition of institutional assets 
used in the comparison of eligible assets to net debit 
caps and peak daylight overdrafts was restricted to 
be consistent with those assets typically included 
for consideration as discount window loan collateral. 
In addition, the estimated asset values were reduced (referred to as a ''haircut'') as described in the ''Fed-
eral Reserve Bank Discount and PSR Collateral Mar-
gins Table.'' 
[note: 40]. Available on line at http://www.ny.frb.org/bankinfo/dwindow/ 
dscntmrgn.pdf. [end of note.] 
The asset data used most likely over-
estimate the amount of assets that would be available 
to collateralize institutions' peak daylight overdrafts 
because no method was readily available to deter-
mine which assets, excluding government securities, 
were already pledged elsewhere. 
In its analysis, the staff found that only a small 
percentage of Federal Reserve account hold-
ers have insufficient eligible balance sheet assets 
to meet a policy requiring the collateralization 
of their net debit cap or peak daylight credit use. 
Some of these institutions, however, are those that 
incur the largest daylight overdrafts. Under a full-
collateralization policy, these institutions could find 
the level of their access to daylight credit dramati-
cally reduced or could incur additional costs to 
acquire assets for collateral purposes. 
Although Federal Reserve staff concluded that a 
full- or partial-collateralization policy could signifi-
cantly reduce and possibly eliminate credit risk to the 
Federal Reserve, such a policy could be costly for 
those institutions that do not already have collateral 
pledged to the Federal Reserve or do not have suffi-
cient eligible assets. In addition, the effects on deposi-
tory institutions' other counterparties are unknown. 
Assessing the true effect of any reduction in credit 
risk to the Federal Reserve is also difficult because 
Reserve Banks already require institutions in deterio-
rating financial condition to pledge collateral to cover 
potential daylight overdrafts. 
Federal Reserve staff assessed many of the costs 
to depository institutions of a full- or partial-
collateralization policy, including the opportunity 
costs to depository institutions that would have to 
acquire additional assets or shift assets away from 
other uses to secure their daylight overdrafts; how-
ever, the events of September 11 may provide new 
perspectives on some additional benefits of such a 
policy. For example, requiring the full or partial 
collateralization of an institution's daylight over-
drafts could facilitate the Federal Reserve Banks' 
lending through the discount window. Because collat-
eral and the appropriate lending agreements would 
likely be in place, depository institutions and the 
Reserve Banks should be able to complete discount 
window loans more easily in the event of a severe 
market disruption that creates liquidity dislocations. 
CONCLUSION. 
Although the research and analyses conducted during 
the Board's review of its daylight credit policies 
provided much information, there are many issues 
that warrant further study. The events of Septem-
ber 11 have changed the way the financial industry, 
including bankers and regulators, views operational 
contingency plans and could likely shape the future 
direction of the PSR policy. Because the payment 
system is dynamic, the Board must continually assess 
whether the policy is efficiently balancing the costs 
and benefits associated with daylight credit. 